Major Themes in Economics
Volume 4

Article 4

Spring 2002

Economic Development Incentive Wars: What influence do State
and Local Economic Development Incentives have on the location
decisions of firms?
Chris Lockie
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright ©2002 by Major Themes in Economics
Recommended Citation
Lockie, Chris (2002) "Economic Development Incentive Wars: What influence do State and Local
Economic Development Incentives have on the location decisions of firms?," Major Themes in Economics,
4, 21-47.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol4/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CBA Journals at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Major Themes in Economics by an authorized editor of UNI ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

Economic Development Incentive Wars
What influence do State and Local Economic
Development incentives have on the location
decisions of firms?
Chris Lockie
ABSTRACT. State and local policymakers throughout the country experience tremendous
pressure from their constituents to create policy tools that spur job growth and reduce
unemployment in their jurisdictions. One tool that has been viewed by policymakers as
useful in stimulating job growth and reducing unemployment has been economic
development incentives. Despite this view, there has been growing concern over the cost
effectiveness of these incentives. This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the
issues surrounding economic development incentives and evidence from four different
methods of study as to the influence incentives have had on employment growth in states
and counties throughout the United States.

I. Introduction
“Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation or
any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure” [Lincoln, in
Bartlett, 1980, 523]. This quote from Abraham Lincoln in his famous
Gettysburg Address described a nation deeply involved in a civil war
over slavery and state’s rights. While the days of the “Great Civil War”
are long passed, states are engaged in a whole new war today, not over
slavery and state’s rights, but over economic development and job
creation. This New Civil War, as Douglas Watson describes it, is the
competition between states for businesses and jobs [1995, x]. While this
competition isn’t the blood bath of the 1860’s, it has been described as
every bit as fierce [Buss, 2001, 90; Burstein, 1995, 1; Bartik, 1995, 1,
Watson, 1995, 7]. The weapons used in this battle among the states are
large incentive packages that states have provided to businesses. 250, 720,
and 600 million dollars have been just some of the totals of incentive
packages given to businesses in the last two decades [Burstein, 1995, 1;
Wilcox, 1999, 1]. In 1993, Alabama provided an incentive package of
$168,000 per new job to attract a Mercedes-Benz plant to Vance,
Alabama [Bartik, 1995, 1]. This is just one example of a trend we are
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witnessing between states as they compete for businesses, which has been
described as the “rule rather than the exception” [Burstein, 1995, 1].
State and local officials buy into this competition because they have
experienced a great deal of public pressure to find ways to create
economic development1 in the form of jobs. These jobs are desirable
from the public’s point of view because of the benefits communities
receive from the creation of new jobs. Beaumont and Hovey in the
Council of State Government’s report describes these benefits in this way:
“that state and local governments compete for business is not surprising
because there are many favorable impacts of job growth in a community.
Land values, newspaper circulation, retail sales, and service business all
increase when a state or local economy expands” [in Wilson, 23]. It also
lowers unemployment, creates higher wages, and increases state or local
tax revenues. Policymakers use incentives as a visible sign of efforts to
create jobs or reduce unemployment in their jurisdictions. This is
important because jobs can mean votes and reelection.
While incentives have been viewed by the public as an indication of
policymakers' commitment to improving their community’s economies,
public criticism and concern over the magnitude and abundance of these
incentives has risen. Waits and Heffernon say that the political risk of
using incentives has risen because voters have begun to question the
wisdom of giving millions of tax dollars to corporations while public
services are being cut [1994, 1]. The skepticism over economic
development incentives has led many to call for reform or elimination of
these incentives. While this may in fact be in order, judgments regarding
these incentives may be premature until a proper analysis of these
incentives can be conducted. Fortunately, much work has already been
done in trying to determine the influence incentives have on the location
decisions of firms. This paper reviews this work, as scholars and
economic development professionals have attempted to determine the
effectiveness of using incentives as an engine for state and local
employment growth. Through this review, we can begin to understand
how beneficial or costly this “Civil War” between the states really is. To
better understand the context of the issues surrounding economic
development incentives, some background on what these incentives are
and how they have evolved is necessary.
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II. Background
Economic Development Incentives can be described as any policy that
provides direct assistance to businesses [Bartik, 1991, 3]. The
Corporation for Enterprise Development breaks these incentives into two
categories: tax and non-tax incentives [2002, 1-2]. Tax incentives are
designed to reduce business costs by lowering the tax burden on the
business in the form of tax exemptions or credits, while non-tax
incentives are also designed to reduce business costs but through grants
of money, programs, or projects. Fisher and Peters in their article in the
New England Review divide these two types of incentives into five
classes:
A. One-time deals negotiated with a specific firm, such as a property tax
exemption.
B. Grants and loans provided under programs that receive annual state
appropriations, where a firm must apply for funding.
C. Programs with established parameters and limits but with some
degree of local government discretion allowed. This would include
property tax abatements2 in some places and tax increment financing
districts3. These programs require no explicit funding, and so have
no annual limits statewide.
D. Tax incentives that function as entitlements: investment tax credits
under the state corporate income tax, and local property tax
abatements in many places. Here the firm receives the benefit
automatically, provided the investment is in an eligible sector and the
size of the investment or number of new jobs exceeds some threshold.
There may be geographic targeting: enterprise zones4 are the major
example.
E. Features of the tax code that apply to every corporation, but benefit
some more than others and are often advertised by economic
development agencies as reasons to locate in that state. Examples are
single-factor apportionment, exemption of inventories from property
taxation, and exemption of fuel and utilities from the sales tax.
[Fisher and Peters, 1997, 110]
The range of incentives provided today is an indication of the importance
states have placed on attracting businesses to their states. In the example
of the Alabama incentive package given to Mercedes-Benz, $112 million
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was given in infrastructure improvements, $30 million to build a training
facility, $60 million for training, $8.7 million for tax abatements on
machinery and construction materials, and $39 million in other incentives
[Fisher and Peters, 1998, 2]. This is just one example throughout the
country where businesses have benefited from large, multi-incentive
packages.
While many believe state and local financial assistance is a fairly
recent phenomenon, this couldn’t be further from the truth. State
financial assistance to businesses actually has its roots in the 17th century
when the State of Massachusetts in 1640 granted the first business
incentive in the country [Wilson, 1989, 29]. In 1791, New Jersey granted
the first tax exemption to a manufacturing company owned by Alexander
Hamilton [Wilson, 1989, 2]. This trend continued through the early 19th
century, and as a result, by 1844 Pennsylvania had invested over 100
million dollars and had placed directors on the boards of over 150
corporations [Wilson, 1989, 2]. Pennsylvania became the leading
example of public investment in private enterprises at that time. This was
to be short-lived, though, as graft and corruption was discovered in many
of the state’s ventures, which led to the enactment of a state law to limit
such activities [Watson, 1995, 11]. This development became a signal to
other states and cities to avoid these types of activities, but it was not long
before incentives emerged once again in response to the massive
economic crisis of the Great Depression.
During the Great Depression, Southern states devised new and
aggressive industrial recruitment strategies that expanded financial
assistance to business [Wilson, 1989, 2]. Mississippi took the lead in
these incentives in 1936 with its adoption of the “Balance Agriculture
with Industry” program that used tax-exempt bonds to reduce the capital
costs associated with the construction of new plants [Wilson, 1989, 2;
Fisher, 1998, 5]. Just as incentives were beginning to become more
prevalent, the emergence of World War II curtailed much of the growth
in the use of financial assistance programs as the nation focused on the
war effort. This trend picked up again in the 1950’s and 60’s [Wilson,
1989, 2]. In 1949, Maine authorized the first statewide business
development corporation, and by 1963, 31 states had such entities
[Wilson, 1989, 2]. Despite widespread growth of incentive programs
during the 50’s and 60’s, the real explosion of business incentives began
in the 1970’s. As a result of recession and the employment crisis in the
seventies and eighties, there was an explosive growth in state and local
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governments' use of economic development incentives. Graph 1 shows
the growth of state tax incentives from 1977 to 1996.
Graph 1

Source: Wilson, 1989, 5; Buss, 2001, 92

As early as the eighties, every state offered some form of tax and financial
incentive [Wilson, 3]. The growth witnessed from 1977 to 1996 was not
only in incentives, but also in the number of professional and economic
development organizations established during that time. Today, every
state in the union and nearly every large city in the country have
established an economic development department or a public-private
partnership with the mission of economic development [Watson, 1995, 2].
This trend would suggest that city and state officials believe that these
economic development departments or partnerships are necessary to
stimulate job growth and development through their use of incentives.
While this may or may not be the case, several arguments can be made for
and against the use of these incentives.

III. Arguments
Michael J. Wolkoff offers two primary rationales for why state and local
governments offer economic development incentives: (1) to encourage
investment within their communities and (2) to forestall other
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jurisdictions’ attempts to lure away their economic base [1990, 30].
These two arguments have led to incentives focused on attracting
businesses as well as incentives designed to help existing businesses. The
first argument is justified by the idea that capital markets are not always
efficient. Proponents feel that governments need to be involved in the
private capital markets in order to correct market imperfections and
redistribute investment and jobs to depressed areas. Watson explains it
in this way:
In the market’s failure to distribute its bounty equitably, we find
justification for an active role by local governments in economic
development. Economic Development efforts are aimed at
creating jobs, retaining present jobs, and generating additional
taxes in communities that result in stable local economies. If the
market does not create jobs or taxes without assistance from local
governments, officials justify using public resources to do so.
[Watson, 1995, 4]
Public officials believe providing public resources to businesses will
lower businesses' start-up or relocation costs, which will in turn lead a
business to locate in that community or state. Wolkoff argues that “for
marginal projects or developers with little track record, the availability of
public financing can make a project viable” [in Bingham, 1990, 31].
Bartik in his book Who Benefits from State and Local Economic
Development Policies? presented arguments that state and local economic
development policies can improve capital market imperfections by
positively influencing local growth, labor markets, and the poor by
redistributing economic activity towards depressed areas if used more
extensively by those areas. He describes it in this way:
The net national benefits of increasing job growth in one local
area and reducing job growth in other areas thus depend on the
relative unemployment rate of the local area that enjoys increased
job growth. If the area has a higher-than-average unemployment
rate, the benefits of reducing unemployment in that local area are
likely to exceed the costs that result from increasing
unemployment in other areas [Bartik, 1991, 192]
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He believes this does in fact happen because “while available evidence is
scant, it indicates that the most needy jurisdictions play the economic
development game the most” [Bartik, 194].
Others argue that incentives are necessary to attract or retain
investment in the United States due to the increase in industrial mobility.
The increase in industrial mobility has expanded the competition for job
creation beyond just competition between states to competition with
countries around the world. As a result, foreign investment in the United
States has become more prevalent, causing state and city officials to feel
immense pressure to provide incentives that attract this investment to
their jurisdictions. Also, state and local policymakers have had to use
incentives to prevent domestic firms from fleeing to underdeveloped
countries where they can take advantage of cost savings on labor or other
things. The retention of businesses then becomes a primary rationale for
providing incentives.
State and local officials claim that “without incentive programs, some
jurisdictions would be at a competitive disadvantage to those jurisdictions
that offer public financing” [Wolkoff, in Bingham, 1990, 31]. This is due
to the fact that companies have come to expect an incentive as part of
their standard business package [Corporation for Enterprise Development,
2002, 5]. These expectations force states and cities to provide incentives
in order to appear to be business friendly in the presence of competition
with other jurisdictions. James Rogers argues that this structure of state
incentives is “akin to the so-called ‘prisoner’s dilemma5’” [2000, 431].
This means that state authorities will not and cannot end incentive
policies on their own due to the competitive disadvantages it would
create, but would rather need an outside force to end this competition.
The Corporation for Enterprise Development says, “state and local
officials actions are fueled by the fear that they will fail to compete
effectively with other states” [2002, 5]. Without an outside force present,
this fear will continue to lead to the use of incentives.
While opponents of these incentives recognize the importance of
these incentives in the face of jurisdictional competition, they argue that
incentives should be eliminated because the costs of providing these
incentives have become larger than their benefits. Proponents of
incentives on the other hand perceive that tax incentive benefits outweigh
their costs because eventually they are repaid directly or indirectly in
taxes and growth [Buss, 2001, 92]. State officials view tax incentives as
“free money” to citizens because in many cases, they only represent tax
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revenues forgone rather than cash paid out [Buss, 2001, 92]. Many of the
incentives provided to businesses by state and local governments either
exempt the business from paying certain taxes or divert the taxes
generated back to the business or to the area where it resides to make
improvements. State and local officials claim that the lost tax revenue
from such policies will eventually be recovered because these businesses
will increase their tax bases through taxes on its operation, property, and
employees. While proponents of these incentives can cling to these
arguments for incentives as justification for their use as a policy tool,
many arguments have emerged as to why these incentives are in fact not
good public policy.
Buss points out that many public interest groups, professional
associations, state and local officials, and congressional delegations claim
incentives are costly, ineffective, and detrimental [Buss, 2001, 90]. First
of all, these incentives are seen as costly because of the large amounts of
tax revenue states and cities forego in order to attract business. It has
been estimated that $15 to 16 billion dollars is spent annually on both
state-level and local-level incentives [The Corporation for Enterprise
Development, 2002, 2]. Waits and Heffernon described these large tax
incentives in two ways: shooting anything that flies and giving away the
store [Heffernon, 1994, 2]. “Shooting anything that flies” refers to the
large amounts of money spent by state and local governments to attract
businesses that do not fit in with the business environment of the state or
city. “Giving away the store” means giving away more resources to a
business than can be recovered in the long run. There is always the
possibility that businesses will go bankrupt or move before the state or
local governments recover lost revenue. The professional economic
development literature is littered with stories of incentives that did not
produce the requisite revenue or job benefits [Fisher and Peters, 1998, 8].
For example, Pennsylvania in 1978 provided a $71 million incentive
package to Volkswagen for a factory projected to employ 20,000 workers,
but the factory never employed more than 6,000 workers and was closed
within a decade [Burstein, 1995, 5]. A well-documented example of
“giving away the store” was found in Alabama’s attraction of MercedesBenz's first auto manufacturing plant in the United States. The incentive
package provided totaled around $300 million dollars. While Alabama
officials deemed the benefits provided by the factory as worthy of the
huge incentive package, the creation of the factory caused numerous
problems. The state missed a $43 million loan payment to the auto
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company and had to use National Guard troops to clear the site for
construction to save money on the project. It eventually led to widespread
taxpayer dissatisfaction and the defeat of the governor who came up with
the deal [The Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2002, 4].
Another argument is that these incentives are ineffective and
unnecessary. Milton Friedman has argued that government should be
limited to its “public good” functions, such as defense and law and order,
and should not be involved in activities that can be performed by the
market [Watson, 1995, 3]. Proponents of Friedman’s views would argue
that state government intervention in the market is unnecessary because
the market, if left alone, would produce full employment and efficiently
distribute resources. The presence of economic development incentives,
it is argued, disrupts the location decisions of businesses because they are
enticed to move away from their optimal locations [Burstein, 1995, 4].
Some claim that economic development incentives have little or no effect
on the location decisions of businesses because other market factors are
more important. Regional variations in construction, transportation, and
energy costs are said to have a much larger influence on firm’s location
decisions than variations in state and local taxes and, presumably,
development incentives [Fisher and Peters, 1997, 111]. In a study done
in 1978, researchers claimed that a “mere two percent difference in wages
could offset as much as forty percent in taxes” [Fisher and Peters, 1997,
111]. A firm’s proximity to its raw materials and markets are also
important location factors that generally overshadow state tax and
incentive policies in a firm’s location decision.
Another argument against economic development incentives is that
the competition that results between states result in a negative or zerosum game. This is the argument that economic development policies
merely redistribute jobs among state and local areas, leaving the number
of jobs in the nation unchanged. Burstein and Rolnick argue that it is
actually a negative-sum game because the revenue lost in the losing states
from the relocation of businesses is greater than the revenue increase in
the winning states or else the businesses would not have relocated [1995,
4]. In response to Bartik’s arguments that high unemployment areas will
experience the most growth because they provide the most incentives,
John Levy, an urban planner at Virginia Tech, argues that “it is unlikely
that more needy places generally out-compete less needy places for new
industry” [Bartik, 1991, 195].
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Opponents also argue that the more states give away in tax revenues,
the less revenue they have to provide public services, which can be
important location factors. Public goods, such as education, quality of
transportation, and availability of recreational activities, can have a large
impact on the location decisions of firms. Therefore, the large amounts
of tax revenue states and cities forego due to incentives hinders their
ability to provide quality public goods and can be detrimental to state and
local efforts to attract business to their jurisdictions.
So who is right? Do economic development incentives produce their
desired effect of job creation or are they merely replacing the market
forces that would guide job creation? With the range of arguments
supporting both sides of this issue, it is hard to determine what influence,
if any, these incentives have on the location decisions of businesses and
to what extent these incentives benefit local and state governments. To
determine incentives' importance in firm’s location decisions, we must
first look at what scholars and business executives have found to be
important factors in the location decisions of firms.

IV. Location Theory
Some of the early writers in Location Theory focused on the nature
and process of plant location decisions. Alfred Weber, a well-known
location theorist, developed the idea that transportation costs were the
main determinants of business location decisions. He speculated that the
best place for a plant to locate was where the cost of transporting raw
materials to the plant and transporting products to the market was the
least [Wilson, 1989, 8]. He argued that the only deviations from his
theory would occur if savings from labor costs or from agglomeration
economies, such as access to markets or proximity to similar firms, were
larger than transportation costs. Others argued that plants locate where
they have a sales advantage or where they could take advantage of high
demand. August Losch argued that companies would choose the location
that maximizes their profits by looking at both the costs and markets at a
particular location [Wilson, 1989, 9]. While all are valid arguments,
theorists and analysts today are beginning to realize that there are more
to location decisions than just the costs or demands at various locations.
Robert Ady, an executive consultant for a business location
consulting firm, said that companies seeking a location use a myriad of
criteria to evaluate locations; some have lists of hundreds, but for most,

30

Lockie: Economic Development Incentive Wars

the list is usually less than 50 [1997, 78]. He goes on to divide those
factors into three categories: operating costs, operating conditions, and
quality of life [Ady, 1997, 78.] Quality of life refers to the cultural
activities, educational capabilities, recreational opportunities, and housing
availability at a particular location. Operating conditions include the
quality of the work force, attitudes of local officials, and executive travel
times. Operating costs would include labor costs, utility costs,
transportation costs, and tax costs. As is evident by this list, the number
of factors that influence business executive’s location decisions are quite
broad. He goes on to say that, “location criteria are different for different
business sectors and different companies within any sector, as well as at
different stages of the site search. This greatly complicates any effort to
discern causal relationships between any given location criterion and
economic activity or growth” [Ady, 1997, 78]. With this in mind, anyone
studying the role and influence of economic development incentives in
this myriad of location factors has a very difficult task. Despite the
complexity of this task, many academics, economic development
professionals, and state and local government officials have attempted to
measure this influence. Four different techniques have emerged to study
the impact and effectiveness of incentives.

V. Measurement Techniques
A. ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUE
Several economists have attempted to answer the question through
econometric studies. These studies have ranged from a focus on state
business climates, to state spending on economic development, to looking
at specific programs. One of the first econometric studies that attempted
to determine what influence economic development incentives had on
firms' location decisions was done by Dennis Carlton in 1979. Carlton
looked at the how differences in wages, taxes, electricity costs, and other
variables within and across Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas6
[SMSA] influenced the creation of new manufacturing singleestablishment plants or branch plants in the SMSAs. One of the variables
he included was a business climate variable which was based on the
number of incentives offered by a state, which he felt was an indication
of the state’s attitude toward business. He found for the single
establishment firms that “in none of the industries did business climate
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enter positively and significantly” [Carlton, in Wheaton, 38]. He found
for branch plants that the business variable had an insignificant negative
influence on branch plant establishments. He finally concluded that “no
evidence could be found to support the view that a favorable business
climate alone can substantially stimulate new locational activity”
[Carlton, in Wheaton, 44].
In 1984, an econometric study by Warren McHone also looked at
SMSA data. He attempted to measure the impact state incentives had on
the spatial patterns of employment growth within twenty-six multi-state
SMSA’s. In order to test this influence, he ran a regression that tried to
determine whether a relationship existed between the development
incentives offered by states, and the employment growth experienced by
counties in different states, but in the same SMSA. He wanted to
compare how employment growth differed between the counties
according to the incentives they received from different states. When
looking at the employment growth differentials between counties and
their SMSA’s, he found that “none of the five explicit industrial
incentives provided by most of the states were statistically significant”
[McHone, 12]. He did, however, find two incentives to be significant
when comparing whether a county’s employment growth was greater or
less than that of its SMSA. He concluded that “the results suggest that
some of the explicit industrial incentive program employed by states as
well as some of their policies that might be viewed as implicit incentives
appear to affect the direction of employment growth differentials within
these multi-state SMSA’s” [McHone, 13].
In1989, Margery Ambrosius did a time-series analysis of how the
adoption of eight different incentives by states influenced the state’s per
capita manufacturing value added and the percent of the state’s labor
force considered unemployed for the time period between 1969-1985,
controlling for national trends in manufacturing value added and
employment. She found “no significant effect on manufacturing value
added7 and only one possible positive effect on the unemployment rate.
[Ambrosius, 1989, 290]. A similar study conducted in 1988 by Michael
Wasylenko compared a variety of fiscal variables with changes in state
employment from 1980 to 1985 with one of the variables including the
number of financial incentives provided by the state. The author of the
study found that the development incentives variable was significantly
associated with lower total employment growth and lower employment
growth in manufacturing and retail trade. On the other hand, a number of
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employee training programs did seem to be statistically significant and
have a positive effect on total manufacturing employment growth [Fisher,
1997, 113]. Therefore, he concluded that “one cannot reject that fiscal
variables may influence firm location” [Fisher and Peters, 97, 113].
Other econometric studies focused on specific incentives' influence
on employment growth. Rubin and Wilder in 1989 compared the growth
of industries within enterprise zones with the overall industry growth in
the Evansville, Indiana Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) from 1983
to 1986. They found that the enterprise zone experienced significantly
more employment growth than the rest of the industries in the Evansville
MSA [Rubin, 426]. They determined that of the 1,878 jobs created in
Evansville Enterprise Zone, 1,430 could be attributed to the comparative
advantage the zone provided when compared to what the area would have
experienced if it grew at the average rate of growth for the entire metro
area [Fisher and Peters, 123]. They then concluded that the substantial
growth in the Evansville Enterprise Zone could not be attributed to either
metropolitan growth or the industrial composition of the zone, but it was
instead a function of the comparative advantage of the area that
comprised the zone [Rubin, 276]. James Papke discovered just the
opposite in another regression analysis of Indiana enterprise zones. He
conducted a regression analysis comparing the level of capital created in
newly formed enterprise zones with the capital created in a control set of
Indiana townships before and after the zones were established. He found
that 7% less capital was created in the designated zones compared with
the capital created in the control group of Indiana townships [Bartik,
1991, 20]. Another study of enterprise zones conducted in 1990 looked
at investment growth and job growth experienced in a subset of 357
enterprise zones found in seventeen states. The authors of the study
found that “the number of zone incentives was positively and significantly
related to both investment and job growth despite the inclusion of many
policy variables” [Fisher and Peters, 124]. When they included some
non-policy variables, however, the incentive variable became
insignificant. Michael Luger and Harvey Goldstein in 1990 used a control
group of counties to compare the influence of research park designations
on county employment growth. They found only 58% of the parks
succeeded in lowering their county’s unemployment rate compared to the
control group [Bartik, 1991, 20].
Another set of studies looked at how state spending on economic
development influenced establishment growth and unemployment. One

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2002

33

such study done by Eng Seng Loh in 1993 looked at Ohio’s development
incentive programs to determine whether the amount of money given in
incentives influenced county-level employment growth in six industries.
He found that the total dollar amount provided or the number of projects
receiving funds in each county influenced employment growth in the
county. He concluded that “while the empirical results are not uniformly
significant or positive, enough evidence exists to show that incentive
programs contributed significantly to Ohio’s county-level growth” [Loh,
379]. Ernest Goss in 1994 attempted to analyze how state economic
development spending as a percentage of gross state product influenced
state growth rates in enterprises and establishments. He found that the
economic development spending variable had a positive impact on both
the formation of new business enterprises and establishments. He stated
that “this result appears consistent since a large portion of economic
development agency spending has traditionally been devoted to
recruitment” [Goss, 1994a, 273-274]. In a similar study done by Goss and
Phillips, they looked at how state economic development spending by
state as a percent of gross state product influenced employment growth
in states. He found that “the coefficient for the economic development
spending variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that
state economic development spending positively affects the employment
growth rate” [Goss, 1994b, 296].
As is clear from the econometric studies presented, results have been
quite mixed as to the influence incentives have had on the growth in
establishments or employment found at the state, county, and
metropolitan area. Earlier studies with simple regression analysis tended
to find that incentives have little influence on employment growth, but
recent studies have found more of an influence. Also, it appears that
economic development spending seemed to have a larger influence on
establishment and employment growth than did the number of incentives
provided.
Econometric studies, despite their usefulness as a method of analysis
have their drawbacks. They have been widely criticized because they
cannot include or measure all the factors that influence business location
decisions. There are too many unobserved characteristics of a city or
state that are unconsciously omitted or unquantifiable in this type of
study. Also, while these studies may be able to assess the effect
incentives have had on a region or state, econometric are not able to give
us a clear picture of incentives' influence on national job creation. Since
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econometric studies have been viewed as so problematic, researchers have
found other methods to try to measure incentives' influence on
employment growth and business decisions. One such approach is the
case study approach.
B. CASE STUDY TECHNIQUE
The case study approach was seen as an alternative to the econometric
approach because it was viewed as a better measure of the effectiveness
of specific economic development programs. Several case studies have
been conducted over the last few decades to try to measure how specific
incentive programs have influenced employment growth in both cities and
states. One such case study looked specifically at the location decisions
behind the creation of a General Motors Saturn plant in 1987. In this
study, the researchers compared the average cost of transport to market,
local labor costs, and state and local taxes for seven different locations
considered by the Saturn executives. They found that Nashville,
Tennessee was the lowest cost site for the plant, which was consistent
with the Saturn executives’ decision to locate the plant in Spring Hill,
Tennessee 35 miles away. The researchers argued though that if
Lexington, Kentucky, the next lowest cost site, had decreased taxes by
just $13 per car that the plant would have located in Lexington [Bartik,
1991, 29]. The table on the next page shows that a $13 decrease per car
would have lowered the total measured cost of the Lexington site to $702,
making it the lowest cost site.
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TABLE 1–Estimated Saturn Costs Per Car

Location
Nashville, TN
Lexington, KY
St. Louis, MO
Bloomington, IL
Kalamazoo, MI
Terre Haute, IN
Marysville, OH

Average
Total
Cost of Local Labor State and
Measured
Transport to
Costs
Local Taxes
Costs
Market
$426
$159
$118
$703
423
186
106
715
419
172
134
725
417
202
162
781
430
244
116
790
413
209
168
790
427
219
169
815
Source: Bartik, 1991, 29

Several other case studies have looked at enterprise zone programs in
various states and have found mixed results. One such study found the
state of New Jersey’s Enterprise Zone program was successful at
generating jobs and was deemed cost-effective [Rubin, in Green, 1991,
118]. An enterprise zone study conducted on three zones established in
Maryland on the other hand found no evidence that the program increased
employment in the zone’s areas [Grasso and Crosse, 1991, 133]. These
are a few of the limited number of studies using the case study method.
It has not been used extensively because like the econometric studies they
are not without their flaws.
Critics of this approach say that case studies fail to account for the
location factors involved in business’ location decisions [Fisher and
Peters, 1997, 117]. Because these studies focus only on whether job
growth occurred in the presence of incentives, they often subjectively
claim that the incentives present were the primary factor in the
employment growth in the study area when in fact it could have been
attributed to a host of factors. Case studies also need to establish a
comparative control group in order to properly measure the precise effects
of the incentives analyzed. If controls for the other variables involved in
location decisions are not created, then one cannot say with any degree of
certainty that one has captured the true effects of the incentive on the
location decision. Yet, it is difficult to determine an identical control
group for comparison.
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C. SURVEY TECHNIQUE
The survey approach has been the most common approach to measuring
the influence of economic development incentives on location decisions.
In this particular approach, researchers survey business executives from
the businesses that created jobs in the city or state. Fisher points out that
surveys often distinguish between “must have” location factors and
merely “desirable or significant” factors [1997, 116-117]. Early surveys
of business executives found that incentives and taxes were an
insignificant factor in location decisions [Wilson, 1989, 13]. In 1982,
Roger Schmenner surveyed Fortune 500 companies and found that only
one percent listed taxes as a “must” factor in selecting a particular broad
region and state for a new branch plant. Thirty-five percent however
listed low taxes as “desirable if available and helped to tip the scales in
favor of this site” [Bartik, 1995, 26-27]. Schmenner commented on the
results of his survey by saying “the results demonstrate, fairly
convincingly, that tax and financial incentives have little influence on
almost all plant location decisions and seem to be, at best, tie-breakers
acting between otherwise equal towns or sites” [Schmenner, inWilson,
1989, 14]. A survey of Appalachian manufacturing plants in 1989 by
Walker and Greenstreet found that only 37 percent of the plant’s
executives stated that incentives were decisive in their final location
decision [Bartik, 1995, 27].
On the other hand, some recent surveys have found that taxes and
incentives are ranked highly by executives in their location decisions. In
the 15th Annual Corporate Survey conducted in 2000 by the Area
Development Magazine, they found that when executives were asked to
rate a number of different site-selection factors, state and local incentives
were rated fifth behind highway accessibility, availability of skilled labor,
labor costs, and the corporate tax rate as the most important business
location factors. Tax exemptions were ranked seventh [Gambale, 2000,
18]. The survey also asked the executives to rate how important tax
exemptions and state and local incentives were in their location decision.
The survey found that 40% of the executives considered these incentives
and exemptions to be very important in their location decisions [Gambale,
2000, 16]. These results would indicate that incentives and exemptions
provided by local and state governments have a rather strong influence on
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the location decisions of firms, but like the other studies, the survey
approach has its flaws as well.
Critics of the survey approach feel that the methodology and
questions used for the surveys bias the results. Consistently, incentives
are rated low as “must have” factors, but rated highly as “significant,
important, or desirable” factors. Therefore, the framing of the question
can severely bias the results. One is also not guaranteed that the person
who made the final location decision was the one who completed the
survey. The survey may thus inaccurately reflect the true motives behind
the location decision. Another problem with surveys is that executives
can be compelled to say incentives were important in their location
decisions even if they played an insignificant role in their location
decisions [Fisher and Peters, 1997, 117]. Executives are compelled to say
this because it could jeopardize their chances of receiving additional
incentives in the future if they gave policymakers the impression that the
incentives had little influence on their location decision. Plus, they do not
want it to appear as though they took advantage of the community in
which they located. Thus, the survey responses might not properly
measure the true importance of the incentives to the business because one
has no way of determining the actual motives behind executive’s
responses and if they gave truthful answers. Regardless of the flaws of
the survey approach, the results once again do not clearly define the
influence that incentives play in site selection. With the problems pointed
out in the previous measurement approaches, a new approach has sparked
the interest of researchers in this field. This approach is called the
Hypothetical Firm Approach.
D. HYPOTHETICAL FIRM TECHNIQUE
The Hypothetical Firm Approach looks at the impact local taxes and
incentives have on a firm’s actual income [Fisher, 1997, 118]. Buss
describes it this way: “Analysts take an industrial sector, then build
models of what they believe are average firms in that industry. Then they
take tax data, averaged for states and localities, and try to describe how
the firm would respond to different taxes and incentives” [2001, 99].
Fisher and Peters, major proponents of this approach, point out that this
approach has primarily been used to study differences in state tax systems
[1998, 59]. They, however, took this approach one step further and
developed a model using the Hypothetical Firm approach that included
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state and local tax and non-tax incentives. They claim it is the first
comprehensive simulation of non-tax incentives in a hypothetical firm
model [Fisher and Peters, 1998, 60].
In their study, they developed a single-location8 and a multi-state9
hypothetical firm for eight different manufacturing industries. They
developed these firms by pouring through the annual reports, federal tax
statistics, and the Census of Manufactures for actual firms in the eight
industries. They chose the eight manufacturing industries that were
experiencing the most growth and had the most geographic mobility.
They then measured how the returns on investment10 of the hypothetical
firms were influenced by tax changes and incentives through the use of
a model called the Tax and Incentive Model. They developed this model
by examining the taxes and incentives found in 112 cities in twenty-four
states. The twenty-four states chosen were those states with the greatest
manufacturing employment.
They sought to answer two questions through their study: can
incentives reasonably be expected to influence business location decisions
and do they influence the spatial distribution of investment returns across
states and cities? They found that variations in incentives and state taxes
seemed to influence the returns on investments for firms at the best and
worst location for each industry. They also found that incentives can be
quite large relative to tax burdens and differences in taxes and incentives
across states and cities were substantial [Fisher and Peters, 1998, 175].
While they did not test a causal model in their study, the magnitude of the
differences in returns on investment, before and after the Tax and
Increment Model was applied, appears to be sufficient to make a
difference in business location decisions at the margin [Fisher and Peters,
1998, 175]. They felt they could reasonably assume from their findings
that tax and incentive differentials between top- and bottom-ranked
locations could sway plant location decisions.
They also attempted to analyze whether taxes and incentives affected
the spatial distribution of investment returns. They analyzed whether the
locations that generated the highest rate of return had the highest rates of
unemployment and poverty or the lowest job growth. They found that tax
incentives displayed a weak positive correlation with unemployment and
non-tax incentives displayed no clear correlation with the state’s
unemployment rate. State taxes on the other hand displayed a strong
negative relationship with the state’s unemployment rate, which seems to
suggest that statewide incentives would only slightly off-set the effects of
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state tax systems. Fisher and Peters found that, “overall, it appears that,
at the state level at least, decades of interstate competition have not
produced a pattern of return on investment that could plausibly contribute
to a redistribution of jobs to states in most need, but rather the opposite”
[Fisher and Peters, 1998, 180]. They ultimately conclude that “after at
least a decade and a half of intense competition for investment and jobs,
and the widespread adoption of pro-development tax policies and
incentives, states and cities have produced a tax and incentive system that
provides no clear inducements for firms to invest in high-unemployment
places” [Fisher and Peters, 1998, 200]. They also looked at job growth
and found that it was negatively correlated with the value of incentives,
which seems to suggest that tax and non-tax incentives produce a pattern
of returns on investment somewhat favoring slow-growth states.
While the Hypothetical Firm Approach has piqued the interest of
scholars, it too is not without its drawbacks. One criticism is that firms
do not always behave in average ways, so using hypothetical firms will
not necessarily represent the true influence of taxes and tax incentives on
actual firms. Fisher and Peters themselves admit that their research did
not look at other location factors or at the benefits firms receive from
taxes, so they were not able to say whether a state’s or a city’s tax and
incentive regime could reasonably be expected to alter a firm’s location
decisions [Fisher and Peters, 1997, 120].

VI. Conclusion
As is clear from the numerous studies that have been conducted by
scholars and economic development professionals, the question of the
influence incentives have on business location decisions has commanded
a great deal of attention. Despite all this attention, the answer to the
question of incentives remains elusive. The variation in the types of
studies devised to answer this question is a testament to the difficulties of
measuring the true influence of economic development incentives on the
location of firms. No clear consensus can be reached from these studies
as to the true influence incentives have on firms' location decisions.
The econometric studies conducted seem to show some relationship
between the presence of incentives and economic development spending
on employment growth, but the relationships are small and inconsistent.
Plus, the inability of these studies to include all the location factors
present in a firm’s location decision cast doubt on their legitimacy.
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Survey results are much the same. While they can account for most of the
location factors involved in the site selection decision, the problems
involved with survey research casts doubt on whether the responses of
business executives accurately reflect the importance of various business
location factors. Case studies on the other hand have been useful in
looking at the impact of particular incentive programs or analyzing the
best location for a particular firm, but the results differed according to the
cases studied and the methods of analysis. Also, the need for establishing
an identical control group for comparison in the case study approach
renders this approach inadequate for answering the question of the
importance of incentives in location decisions. The last approach
presented seems to have been given the most attention of late by scholars,
but it too is not without its limitations. The lack of studies using this
approach is a testament to the reluctance of scholars to utilize this
approach. Besides being time consuming, these studies do not control for
the other factors in the site selection process, thus diminishing this
approach's effectiveness in answering the location question.
While it appears that the inconclusiveness of the studies on economic
development incentives provide us with no basis for eliminating economic
development incentives and stopping this competition between states, the
answer to this question may be in the lack of evidence. If we cannot
clearly demonstrate that incentives are needed to attract jobs to a
particular region or provide their intended benefits, then the elimination
of these incentives should be explored. The real question is whether jobs
would be created nationally without the presence of these incentives. We
could venture to say that businesses would continue to expand and create
jobs without the presence of state or local tax or non-tax incentives
through private financing, but one could argue that certain regions of the
country would continually lose in the face of interjurisdictional
competition due to their high taxes and high unemployment. While this
may be the case, each criteria used by executives to evaluate various sites
varies dramatically according to the characteristics of the firm.
Therefore, regardless of the disadvantages certain locations have, they
also may have a host of advantages that appeal to particular firms. Robert
Ady said, “Site selection is a dynamic process, not a static approach. At
each level of screening, the site location criteria are different, as is the
relative importance of each criterion” [1997, 78].

VII. Policy Implications
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If it is indeed the case that incentives may not play a crucial role in
creating jobs, what should be done about these incentives? Some
reformers and critics of incentives say that incentives can represent good
public policy if they are structured to meet certain conditions. Heffernon
and Waits offer four conditions which incentives should meet in order to
improve their accountability and effectiveness [1994, 2]. For one,
incentives should be used to accomplish clearly defined goals based on
an overall economic development strategy. To accomplish this, goals
should be established by the jurisdiction as a set of guidelines to be
followed in all cases. If the state’s goal is to create high-wage jobs, then
they should avoid bidding for businesses that offer only minimum-wage
jobs. Along these lines, state and local officials should structure
incentives to fit the businesses they are trying to attract. The Corporation
for Enterprise Development describes it as, ”picking the right incentives”
[2002, 8]. Other reformers say that improving public services to fit the
needs of those businesses would also help state and local governments
achieve their goals. In fact, some critics of incentives have argued that
state and local officials should limit their use of incentives and compete
solely by improving their public services. Proponents of this solution feel
competition over basic public services between state and cities would be
a more efficient use of public funds than giving incentives.
The second solution offered by Waits and Heffernon is that incentives
should be subjected to rigorous cost-benefit analysis in both the short and
long terms. Policy makers should then pick those incentives that “not
only help firms, but have the largest public benefits” [The Corporation for
Enterprise Development, 2002, 8]. This would help ensure that only
projects that have a high likelihood of creating the jobs promised are
given incentives. It should also limit the dollar amount of incentives
given to a single firm.
Third, incentives should be viewed as investments in the state or city
so that they retain their value even if the business departs. Offering
incentives such as infrastructure improvements or training programs
would be an investment that would help attract businesses and have longterm benefits. Many economic development professionals have
recognized that training programs have social benefits that aren’t present
with tax incentives. The skills people acquire from the programs have the
long-run benefits of improving their employability.
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The last solution to these incentives is that incentives should be made
legally binding so that businesses are held accountable for their promises
and performance. This would help prevent the exit of a business before
it has generated the revenue needed to pay back the state or local
government that provided the business incentives. Four methods of
recourse are available to state and local governments to improve the
accountability of the business they attract. One is recisions, which is the
ability to cancel a subsidy agreement if they so choose. Another is
clawbacks, which is the ability of a state or local government to recover
all or part of the subsidy costs if the business moves or goes bankrupt.
Another option is to establish penalties, such as fines or charges, if the
business fails to perform or relocates. The last legal option is called
recalibration. This is where adjustments to a subsidy can be made to
reflect changing business conditions. This allows the state or local
governments to reduce the subsidy they are providing if the company is
doing well or adjust the payments on loans if the business is struggling to
meet payments.
While these reforms are seen as important improvements or solutions
to the incentive problem, state and local policymakers will still continue
to face pressure from competition with other jurisdictions to continue
their abuse of incentives. To eliminate this pressure, some have called for
the federal government to eliminate this competition and state and local
governments' ability to provide tax and non-tax incentives.
Proponents of the elimination of incentives believe that Congress
holds the right under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to regulate
interstate competition and states use of incentives. The original intent of
the Commerce Clause was to create an economic union, particularly by
ending the trade war among the states that prevailed under the Articles of
Confederation [Burstein, 1995, 1]. Burstein and Rolnick argue in their
critique of the use of incentives by states that,
It is now time for Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause
power to end another economic war among the states. . . . while
the Court has not confronted the constitutionality of states
engaging in these activities, it has expressed the view that these
activities may be “admirable,” and it would probably find that
they fulfill a legitimate public purpose. Economists reach a
different conclusion. They find that there is a role for
competition among states when it takes the form of general tax
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and spending policy. Such competition led states to provide
more efficient allocation of public and private goods. But when
that competition takes the form of preferential treatment for
specific businesses, not only is it not “admirable,” it interferes
with interstate commerce and undermines the national economic
union by misallocating resources and causing states to provide
too few public goods [1995, 1-2].
While it may in fact be desirable for Congress to end this competition
between states, scholars and economic development professionals do not
see this as a possibility. William Fox, a professor of economics at
Tennessee, said in a national symposium of experts on economic
development policies that, “I would be particularly concerned about
having the federal government tell the states how to formulate their tax
policy. That is not something I would like to see” [Fox, 1997, 143]. One
of the arguments against federal intervention is that it would place
undesirable restrictions on states' rights. Peter Enrich in that same
symposium felt that the courts would be the crucial player in ending this
state competition by claiming that this competition is in fact in violation
of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which would “provide a
powerful incentive for Congress to try to figure out a reasonable balance
in what states should be permitted to do” [Enrich, 1997, 146]. But even
then, he recognized that Congress would have to take action to set the
parameters and provide the authorization for these incentives, which
would be difficult [Enrich, 1997,145-146]. It would be difficult because
federal policymakers would have trouble deciding whether a specific
policy was an acceptable or unacceptable practice. Also, large variations
in the types of incentives provided by states would make restrictions and
enforcement even more difficult. Robert Ebel, another symposium
panelist, also commented on federal government intervention by saying,
“I will argue strongly that federal policymakers should neither promote
or dampen interstate competition because although intervention may bring
some short-term gains, federal intervention would be far more costly than
allowing interstate competition” [Ebel, 1997, 147].
The concern over federal intervention echoed by many scholars and
practitioners in the economic development field leaves us with little hope
of ending this interstate competition. Therefore, as long as strong cases
cannot be made as to the detrimental effects of these incentives, which
would be needed to spur federal intervention, the use of incentives in the
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war between states for jobs and businesses will continue. This leaves us
in the precarious position of how to deal with this “New Civil War”
between the states. Our best hope may lie in our policymakers' abilities
to implement policy reforms, while we wait for scholars and economic
development professionals to develop studies that clearly determine the
true influence economic development incentives have on the location
decisions of firms.
End Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

“Economic Development” is a fairly broad term with multiple definitions, but the
definition used in this paper is from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Economic
Development Administration, which is, “enhancing the factors of productive
capacity-land, labor, capital, and technology- of a national, state, or local economy”
[Economic Development Administration, 2002, 1].
“Property Tax Abatement" means the full or partial exemption of taxes on eligible
properties located in a reinvestment zone designated as such for economic
development purposes [City of Arlington, 1].
“Tax Increment Financing Districts” are districts where the property tax revenue
generated by new construction in the district is deposited in a special fund and used
to pay for public improvements within that district [Klacik, in Johnson, 2001, 17].
Tax Increment Financing is viewed as a way to finance public facilities by directly
connecting the population that requires the infrastructure to the allocation of expected
property enhancement effects and related property tax burdens [Klacik, in Johnson,
2001, 17].
An “Enterprise Zone” is an area designated by state and local governments to induce
private investment by removing unnecessary governmental regulatory barriers to
economic growth and to provide tax incentives and economic development program
benefits [City of Houston, 1]. These are often established in distressed areas in order
to spur investment and job growth in the designated zone.
The idea of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” comes from a genre of theory called Game
Theory. Game theory describes a situation where various players are competing with
the common goal of winning. If in fact this is the goal of the game, rational players
will play so as to encourage the best outcome for themselves [Poundstone, 1950, 44].
In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, if a prisoner is given a chance to be set free if
he testifies against a friend and the friend is faced with the same situation, a rational
prisoner would testify against his friend with the hope of being set free and for fear
of betrayal by his friend. If they both remained silent, they would probably both be
better off, but the fear of betrayal causes both of them to testify against each other,
thus making them both worse off. This same relationship can be said to be present
in the use of economic development incentives. If all states agreed to end their use
of incentives, they probably would all be better off, but the possibility of short-term
gains from the use of incentives would lead states to cheat on the agreement, which
would cause all states to cheat in the hopes of themselves benefiting from the shortterm gains from breaking the agreement. Thus, if states act rationally, they will
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continue to compete for economic development with incentives because it would be
irrational to act otherwise.
6. A “Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area or Metropolitan Statistical Area” is a large
population nucleus, together with adjacent communities which have a high degree of
social and economic integration with that core. Metropolitan areas comprise one or
more entire counties, except in New England, where cities and towns are the basic
geographic units. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines
metropolitan areas for the purpose of collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal
data. Metropolitan area definitions result from applying published standards to
Census Bureau data [U.S. Census Bureau, 1]. More specifically, each Metropolitan
Area (MA) must contain either a place with a minimum population of 50,000 or a
Census Bureau-defined urbanized area and a total MA population of at least 100,000.
A MA comprises one or more counties and may include one or more outlying
counties that have close economic and social relationships with the central county.
An outlying county must have a specified level of commuting to the central counties
and also must meet certain standards regarding metropolitan character, such as
population density, urban population, and population growth.
7. Per capita, “Manufacturing Value Added” is the value that is added by manufacturing
operations in a given jurisdiction divided by the population. It is calculated by
subtracting the value of inputs to production from the value of the outputs produced
by the manufacturing plant [Hovey, 2001, 75].
8. A “Single-location firm” is defined by Fisher and Peters as a firm whose total assets
fall into the 25th percentile of total asset size of firms in that industry. In other words,
only 25 percent of the firms in that industry had lower total assets. Fisher and Peters
assumed that these low total assets signaled the presence of small single-location
firms.
9. A “Multi-state firm” is defined by Fisher and Peters as a firm that’s total assets fall
into the 75th percentile of total asset size of firms in that industry. They assumed that
these large total assets were an indication of the size of the firms and their presence
in numerous states.
10. “Returns on investment” is the increase in the firm’s cash flow attributable to the
investment in the new plant. This was calculated by Fisher and Peters by simulating
the firm’s revenues and costs over a twenty-year time period, which produced a
stream of annual cash flow figures [Fisher, 1998, 78]. Therefore, they used the Tax
and Increment Model they devised to see how taxes and incentives influenced these
simulated cash flows in that twenty-year period.
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